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Abstract Disaster management agencies should be exem-
plars of learning given the volatility of their operating environ-
ment. However, there are cognitive, social, and organizational 
barriers that prevent these organizations from learning. The 
purpose of this article is to use the Caribbean Disaster and 
Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) as an example of 
an organization that achieves double-loop learning in spite 
of known barriers. This research shows significant learning 
variations in the CDEMA organization from the regional to the 
national level. The results demonstrate that the CDEMA Coor-
dinating Unit and a few national member agencies achieve 
double-loop learning, while the opposite is true for many 
national disaster offices. Analysis of this variation is one con-
tribution to the disaster management and organizational learn-
ing literature. The article also suggests that organizational 
culture is an important precursor to learning and adds a much 
needed case example to the management and learning litera-
ture. The study ends with a proposal for future research in 
the area of disaster management, culture and learning, and 
propositions for national disaster offices to consider in order to 
enhance double-loop learning. 
Keywords Caribbean, CDEMA, disaster management, 
double-loop learning, learning barriers 
1 Introduction
Disaster management agencies should be particularly con-
cerned about creating an organizational culture committed to 
learning. These organizations need to survive and thrive in a 
changing environment (Torlak 2004). According to Garvin, 
Edmondson, and Gino (2008), learning organizations are 
adept at two groups of skills. First, they are good at creating, 
acquiring, interpreting, transferring, and retaining knowledge. 
Second, they are able to modify their behavior to respond to 
the new knowledge and insights they gain. Disaster manage-
ment agencies operate in volatile environments that require 
great agility and adaptability. They must orient themselves to 
routine disaster events as well as to the increasing incidence 
of low probability catastrophic events that accompany the 
warming of the globe among other drivers. Sanne (2012) 
stresses the crucial need for these skills in the survival of 
safety critical industries like disaster management agencies 
that must work to save lives and property. 
Prominent organizational theorists including Chris Argyris 
and Donald Schön (1978), Edgar Schein (1985), Alfred 
Chandler (1990), Chris Argyris (1996), and Peter Senge 
(1990, 2003) endorse the idea of creating a culture dedicated 
to learning in organizational systems. They suggest that a 
culture committed to self-diagnosis and learning is needed in 
an environment characterized by rapid change and deepening 
complexity such as disaster management organizations. If 
disaster management organizations commit to a culture of 
learning, then leaders facilitate continuous expansion of their 
employees’ capacity to create the desired results, and they 
nurture new ways of thinking. Employees—individually and 
collectively—are continually learning how to learn (Senge 
1990). By facilitating learning, leaders in these organizations 
are then able to meet the challenges of a turbulent world 
(Morgan 1997). 
The empirical evidence on disaster management supports 
the view that these agencies must learn if they want to adapt 
and be successful. These organizations must not only inten-
tionally practice information collection, but they must also 
reflect on the information collected or generated, and reorient 
their thinking and practices if they are to be effective (Smith 
and Elliot 2007). The policy and disaster management litera-
ture documents the special importance of learning to disaster 
management organizations (Carroll 1998; Smith and Elliot 
2007; Birkland 1997; Sanne 2012). Yet, as McPherson, Elliot, 
and Antonacopoulou (2010) point out, there is persistent 
barriers to capturing lessons from failure. 
Many of the barriers concern cognitive biases embedded 
in the values and belief systems of disaster managers that 
cause them to miss some of the lessons from disaster events 
(Torlak 2004). Constant reorientation from varying events 
they face means that they often miss appropriate lessons and 
repeat errors resulting in future vulnerabilities (Sanne 2012). 
In addition, self-interest and political oversight make drawing 
lessons from events difficult. Disaster managers “need to 
learn through thorough scrutiny of the few serious events that 
do happen to them, from near-miss events, learn from others’ 
experience and learn from non-events through simulation, 
interdisciplinary investigation teams, learning seminars, 
risk analysis and the like” (Sanne 2012, 3). The processes, 
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environment, and leadership of managers must be conducive 
to learning (Garvin, Edmondson, and Gino 2008). 
In his 1985 book on Organizational Culture and Leader-
ship Schein posed an important question about organizations: 
Is it possible to create a culture committed to continuous self-
diagnosis, learning, and change? (Schein 1985, 361). Using 
this question as a point of departure, the purpose of this article 
is to show how CDEMA has used various means to achieve 
double-loop learning despite well-known barriers to learning 
in high-hazard organizational environments. CDEMA faces 
not only routine hazard impacts, but also low-probability, 
high-impact catastrophic events. This article examines 
CDEMA’s experiences to show how and what information the 
agency collects or creates and how it applies lessons learned. 
This research both contributes to the academic literature 
on disaster management and organization theory and adds a 
much needed case example on organizational learning in 
disaster management. Smith and Elliot (2007) citing Pauchan t 
and Douville’s (1993) extensive review of the disaster and 
crisis management literature, note the neglect of cultural and 
psychological dimensions of crisis management including 
organizational learning. Smith and Elliot (2007, 5) emphasize 
that in crisis management we must move the notion of learn-
ing “beyond narrowly defined technical solutions toward 
fundamental shifts in the areas of culture, cognitive represen-
tations and communications—the human-centered, suppos-
edly ‘softer’ aspects of organizations.” This article focuses 
on culture and how it helps or hinders learning. It also shows 
that while there are known barriers to learning in disaster 
management organizations, double-loop learning is possible. 
In addition, the article offers practical insights on how 
disaster managers and planners can leverage organizational 
learning to improve performance and thereby reduce loss of 
life and property as well as economic, social, and cultural 
dislocation. 
2 Methods
This case study is a follow-up study to the one I concluded 
(Thompson 2010) on disaster management in multi-state 
disaster management systems and the critical role that learn-
ing plays in the CDEMA system. The research’s main 
assumption is that to be effective, disaster management enti-
ties must act like active learning systems organized around 
the logic of anticipating and preempting all possible disasters 
including low probability, catastrophic events as well as 
routine emergencies. It uses this state of active learning, 
anticipation, reflection, and preemption as a proxy for a 
“culture of learning” as proposed by Schein. 
The original research utilized secondary sources as well as 
the responses to 24 in-depth face-to-face interviews: nine 
with national disaster coordinators; four with senior employ-
ees of national disaster offices; six with senior employees 
at the CDEMA Coordinating Unit; two from senior staff at 
international agencies funding programs at CDEMA; two 
with consultants/academics working with CDEMA; and one 
with a former senior employee of the CDEMA Coordinating 
Unit. Interviews focused on organizational structure, organi-
zational capacity, learning, and politics, and their effects on 
the effectiveness of disaster management agencies. The pri-
mary research question guiding this research is: Is it possible 
to create a culture committed to continuous self-diagnosis, 
learning, and change in disaster management agencies? 
This question is broken down into four sub-questions: Does 
CDEMA learn? What are the sources of learning? What does 
it learn? How are lessons applied? The interviews revealed 
thick descriptions of the scope of learning, what CDEMA 
learns and how it applies knowledge. Interviews were fol-
lowed by observations and discussions with disaster manag-
ers at the 6th Annual Caribbean Conference held in Trinidad 
and Tobago 5–9 December 2011 where the author was the 
chair of a panel on the Competencies and Skills for Effective 
Implementation of Comprehensive Disaster Management 
(CDEMA 2011). 
The article is organized as follows: It begins with a review 
of the literature on learning, organizations, and organizational 
culture that focuses on high hazard organizations. Then it 
provides a brief background of the Caribbean region where 
CDEMA resides, and offers an outline of the CDEMA sys-
tem. Next it presents CDEMA’s learning model and describes 
and examines whether and what CDEMA learns, demon-
strates how it applies knowledge, and assesses how this 
application constitutes double-loop learning. Next the article 
examines the barriers to double-loop learning. It concludes by 
revisiting the question proposed at the start of the article: Is 
it possible to create a culture committed to continuous self-
diagnosis, learning, and change—double-loop learning?
3 Characteristics of the Learning 
Organization and Disaster Management
Learning is the intentional practice of collecting information, 
reflecting on it, and sharing the findings produced by this 
introspective process within the organization so as to improve 
the organization’s performance (Milway and Saxton 2011). 
Learning occurs when entities acquire new knowledge 
or their experiences modify existing knowledge, challenging 
the default logic (Serrat 2009). According to Weick (1991), 
if there is a shift in performance when the stimulus has 
essentially remained the same, then learning has taken place.
Organizations engage in either single- or double-loop 
learning (Senge 1990). Senge has noted that single-loop 
learning is a precursor to double-loop learning. Single-loop 
learning focuses on current, short term problem solving at the 
expense of critical assessment of the conditions that led to the 
current results in the first place (Senge 1990). Single-loop 
learning works in organizations that undertake routine-type 
work. Double-loop learning, on the other hand, focuses on 
redefining problems and questioning common sense thinking 
about them (Senge 1990). 
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Table 1 presents a summary of the common features of 
single- and double-loop learning. The move from single- to 
double-loop learning constitutes a fundamental shift in an 
organization’s culture, strategic focus, and employee engage-
ment. Disaster management agencies that boast a culture of 
learning reside on the double-loop learning side of Table 1. 
These organizations’ leaders facilitate an organizational cli-
mate that is suited to learning. They encourage and facilitate 
both access to, and cultivation of, knowledge as well as the 
transfer and interpretation of knowledge.
No one disaster management agency will acquire all the 
skills, competencies, and experiences necessary for compre-
hensive disaster management simply because they will not 
undergo the range of experiences necessary to build these 
skills and competences. Because they are expected to handle 
all types of hazards and all phases of the disaster management 
cycle, we expect disaster management agencies to reside on 
the double-loop side of Table 1. Consequently, they have to 
cultivate knowledge as much as they have to capture it. 
Reflection is one method of knowledge creation. Green-
wood, borrowing from Schön (1983, 1987), suggests that 
reflective practices facilitate the integration of theory and 
practice, the correction of errors, and the questioning of 
values and norms that underpin the organization’s operating 
context. Reflection leads to an understanding of the barriers 
that limit effectiveness and generates a more comprehensive 
knowledge base, thereby improving outcomes in future 
events. Reflection requires a “cognitive post mortem where a 
practitioner reviews her actions to explore again the under-
standings she brought to them in light of her outcomes” 
(Greenwood 1998, 1049). Double-loop learning involves 
reflections-on-action. 
Sadly, many disaster management organizations do not 
have the time to reflect because of the hectic pace of their 
operating environment. There are also sometimes large 
intervals between disasters, which can lead to complacency. 
In addition, change in leadership and other key staff and 
impact the organization’s culture for learning.
Double-loop learning does not come easy. There must be a 
strategic emphasis on learning by leaders to overcome the 
barriers to this form of learning. Many disaster management 
leaders, knowing that organizations need to learn, grapple 
with how to make their organizations learning organizations 
(Torlak 2004; Milway and Saxton 2011). Others do not learn 
from past experiences and near misses because there are 
barriers to doing so.
4 Cognitive, Social, and Organizational 
Barriers to Double-Loop Learning in 
Disaster Management
Jaques (2009) observes that there is extensive scholarship on 
the proven barriers to effective post-crisis learning. Smith and 
Elliot (2007) cite a number of cognitive and social barriers to 
the emergence of double-loop learning crisis organizations. 
Cognitive barriers include the rigidity of core beliefs, values, 
and assumptions; the failure to recognize similar or identical 
situations that happen elsewhere; and the focus on single-
loop, or single-cause, learning. 
Disaster managers’ beliefs, values, expectations, and pref-
erences heavily determine their perception and interpretation 
of a situation (Smith and Elliot 2007; Sanne 2012; Carroll 
1998). Rigidity of core beliefs, values, and assumptions 
means that managers tend to absorb those pieces of informa-
tion that fit in with their own beliefs and disregard the 
information that does not (Torlak 2004; Sanne 2012). This 
situation often leads to managers intentionally misinterpret-
ing the real threats and stick to the actions that uphold their 
belief system (Torlak 2004; Sanne 2012). 
Disaster managers sometimes fail to recognize similar or 
identical situations that happen elsewhere because of the 
frequency with which these situations occur. For instance, 
event frequency may cause managers to wrongly assume that 
the deficiencies seen are representative, when they are not 
(Torlak 2004). They might assume that because they handle 
routine disaster fairly well, they would be just as successful in 
dealing with high impact, low probability events.
A focus upon single-loop, or single-cause, learning may 
bind managers to a losing course of action as they try to refine 
existing decisions when they should be questioning their 
basic assumptions (Torlak 2004). For instance, managers who 
are always putting out “fires,” dealing with one problem after 
another read everything as a fire to be put out.
Table 1. Summary of common features of single-loop and double-loop learning 
Dimensions Characteristics of Single-Loop Learning Characteristics of Double-Loop Learning
Focus Problem solving for goal attainment; Capturing lessons Strategic questioning of assumptions; Cultivating knowledge; Capturing lessons
Perspective Future strategies depend on prior experiences Future strategies involve creating and solving problems; Questioning 
assumptions; Integration of new and old ideas
Impact Incremental improvements Improvements are transformative
Outlook Short term Long term
Strategy Passive engagement Active engagements; Scenario mapping
Culture Putting out fires, reducing vulnerabilities; Addressing 
operational issues
System-wide thinking, self-questioning; Rethinking assumptions
Source: This table was refined from one developed in Thompson 2010, 243. The original table was developed using the works of organizational theorists 
including Argyris and Schön (1978), Wimberg and Hollins (2002), Wittrock (1992), and Senge (1990), and my understanding of organizational learning.
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Social barriers are often wrapped up in political and 
psychological factors (Smith and Elliot 2007; Torlak 2004). 
Psychologically, the manager, self-interested in keeping his 
job and saving face, often distorts the event in the aftermath 
of the crisis event. As a consequence, the manager ignores the 
broader implications of the crisis and exposes the organiza-
tion to future vulnerabilities. In addition, managers often 
misinterpret the real threats that exist because of constant 
pressure by political actors to perform. This causes the disas-
ter manager to behave irrationally so as to save his and the 
organization’s reputation. For example, because of political 
pressure, disaster managers might be quick to act, ignoring 
lessons that could be critical in successfully resolving crises.
There are also organizational barriers to learning. Simon 
and others suggest that structure and learning are related in a 
circular manner. Structure is an outcome of learning, but also 
determines learning processes (Simon 1969; Fiol and Lyles 
1985). A centralized mechanistic structure tends to reinforce 
past behaviors, while an organic, more decentralized structure 
tends to allow shifts of beliefs and actions and facilitates 
greater learning because there is a reduction of the cognitive 
overload on the individual (Fiol and Lyles 1985). To over-
come some of the cognitive, social, and organizational barri-
ers Torlak (2004, 96) recommends that disaster management 
organizations “should have flexible structures and cultures 
that motivate managers to find better ways of behaving, 
or new methods, contexts, and alternatives.” The barriers 
noted above are rooted in the cultural context of the disaster 
management organization.
5 Organizational Culture and Its 
Importance to Learning
Culture is the climate, learned behavior, and practices that 
organizations develop over time. It guides the way people 
work, the way they communicate, and the values they share 
and is an important explanatory variable in clarifying why 
organizations succeed or fail (Schein 2004). Culture points to 
phenomena that are below the surface, that, although invisi-
ble, are powerful influences on the organization in important 
ways. It creates shared values in organizational members and 
also guides their actions much like an individual’s personality 
does (Schein 2004; Chandler 1990). In the area of crisis and 
emergency management, McPherson, Elliot, and Antonaco-
poulou (2010) lament that organizational culture is so little 
taken into consideration when we assess learning, yet culture 
is important because it constitutes the organizational context. 
Learning, they note, is purposeful and contextually specific. 
The context within which learning takes place shapes the 
learning process because it provides symbolic undertones 
for learning. Hence, when we ignore culture in disaster 
management and how it impacts learning, we miss some of 
the explanatory richness that culture facilitates.
Culture affects organizations at several levels of operation. 
At the level of overall business environment, cultural values 
guide business operations, provide its legal context, and, 
importantly, provide the broad meanings by which we inter-
pret business events (Chandler 1990). For instance, disaster 
management organizations that are focused on technical 
issues tend to understand crises in technical terms and 
propose technical solutions. Their culture limits these organi-
zations’ assessment of phenomena, which results in them 
missing cues that are not technically linked. At the sub-
organizational level, we belong to socially defined groups 
that have common experiences that further filter our interpre-
tation of events—subcultures. The prevalence of multiple 
groups and, consequently, multiple identities provide diver-
sity to values and understanding. This enriches learning 
(Chandler 1990). Unfortunately, technical values often co-opt 
other dominant values in disaster management. At the level 
of the organization, it is the overall business culture that 
dominates and dictates the values of the organization and its 
operational context. A business culture that places value on 
learning promotes a culture dedicated to it and vice versa. 
Schein (2004) cites research that shows that we can improve 
organizational performance by creating a certain kind of cul-
ture that nurtures inquiry, values performance, and identifies 
with the entire organization. 
This review has several implications. The literature offers 
a guide to the link between organizational culture and learn-
ing. It also identifies necessary attributes of learning and cues 
us into the variations between single-loop learning and 
double-loop learning. It shows the importance of double-loop 
learning to disaster management, but also questions whether 
this type of learning is possible in disaster management orga-
nizations. The disaster and crisis management literature tends 
to focus on technical, cognitive, and social barriers to learn-
ing, ignoring the organizational factors such as structural and 
cultural barriers. This article shows how organizational 
factors, including organizational culture, inhibit double-loop 
learning at the country level. In addition, the literature on 
learning indicates that the learning organization displays a 
culture of learning throughout the organization. A disaster 
management organization might also exhibit different cul-
tures throughout its multiple levels. Moreover, the article 
pulls together the theoretical knowledge on learning as well 
as empirical investigation into CDEMA to add to the disaster 
management and organizational learning literature. The 
attributes of double-loop learning form an analytical frame 
for assessing whether CDEMA learns, and whether what it 
learns constitutes double-loop learning (learning culture). 
The following sections draw on the experiences of the 
Caribbean regional disaster management system CDEMA. 
These sections present CDEMA’s background, and its 
implicit learning model. They also examine how CDEMA 
uses knowledge, and whether this application implies single- 
or double-loop learning. 
6 Caribbean Regional Background 
In the Caribbean, the impact of natural hazards has had 
serious negative consequences on economic development 
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(Thompson 2010). Disasters related to hurricanes have been 
the most frequent hazard, but earthquakes and volcanoes have 
caused the most loss of life. Since the late 1970s several hur-
ricanes have devastated the region and overwhelmed each 
territory’s efforts to respond (Poncelet 1997). Most notable 
storms are Gilbert (1988), Hugo (1989), Ivan (2004), Katrina 
(2005), and Dean (2007). Multiple flooding and landslides 
caused by heavy rains occurred in between (Thompson 2010; 
Reliefweb n.d.).
In the last decade, there have been two high-impact, low-
probability events in the region: Hurricane Ivan in 2004 and 
the Haitian earthquake and subsequent cholera outbreak 
in 2010. These events and the responses to them highlight 
multiple weaknesses and flawed assumptions in CDEMA. 
Hurricane Ivan highlighted the multiple, devastating impacts 
that one storm system could have on several countries. The 
countries of Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts, and Nevis were the 
most severely impacted. In fact, Grenada was so economi-
cally devastated after Hurricane Ivan that that country’s 
government was unable to repay its national debts and had to 
enter into cooperative arrangements with creditors including 
the International Monetary Fund on debt repayment terms for 
the rest of 2004 and 2005 (United Nations Economic Com-
mission of Latin America and the Caribbean 2007). The same 
hurricane almost completely obliterated Jamaica’s agricul-
tural sector, costing the country about 8 percent of its GDP 
(United Nations Economic Commission of Latin America 
and the Caribbean, United Nations Development Program, 
and Planning Institute of Jamaica 2004). Hurricane Ivan 
slowed economic developmental activities and resulted in 
long-term persistent economic difficulties (Thompson 2010; 
Jones, Bisek, and Ornstein 2001; United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, United 
Nations Development Program, and Planning Institute of 
Jamaica 2004). Overall, James (2005) estimates over USD 
5.7 billion in recovery costs from Hurricane Ivan. The Haitian 
earthquake and cholera outbreak in 2010 killed tens of thou-
sands of people, injured another 300,000, and left nearly one 
million homeless (Associated Press 2011). The earthquake 
overwhelmed Haiti’s health care and economic infrastructure. 
It required concerted efforts on the part of bilateral and mul-
tilateral agencies as well as from CDEMA to get the disaster 
in check. The efforts to rebuild Haiti are ongoing.
7 The Caribbean Disaster and 
Emergenc y Management Agency (CDEMA)
An agreement of the Conference of Heads of Government of 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries established 
the regional disaster management mechanism Caribbean 
Disaster and Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) in 
September 1991. Its mission was to plan for and respond to 
disasters in the Caribbean (CARICOM Secretariat n.d.). By 
September 2009, there was a name change to the Caribbean 
Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) to 
better comport with the shift in focus from disaster response 
to comprehensive disaster management using the all hazards, 
all phases approach (PreventionWeb 2009). CDEMA’s focus 
is to plan for and mitigate disaster risks in the Caribbean 
including a central focus on the interface between climate 
change and disaster management (CDEMA n.d., a). 
CDEMA’s founding philosophy is that the countries of the 
region succeed or fail together. As such, the organization 
adopted common standards for sharing responsibility and 
common commitments to disaster management (Collymore 
2008).
The CDEMA organization is complex and comprises 
several levels of operation and decision making and multiple 
vertical and horizontal linkages (Figure 1). It is one of the 
specialized agencies of CARICOM coming under the portfo-
lio of the Council for Trade and Economic Development 
(COTED), which is one of CARICOM’s seven protocols 
detailing how it functions. The Council sits atop the CDEMA 
organization, comprises the heads of government of the par-
ticipating member states or their nominees, and determines 
the policies and programs of CDEMA. The Technical Advi-
sory Committee (TAC) is the technical and programmatic 
advisory mechanism of CDEMA. It comprises the National 
Disaster Coordinators and representatives of specialized 
regional bodies, such as those engaged in technological, 
meteorological, and seismological fields whose programs are 
directly related to the regional disaster management agenda 
(CDEMA n.d., b). The eighteen CDEMA participating mem-
ber states—Barbados, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Antigua and Barbuda, Montserrat, Anguilla, 
Turks and Caicos, the Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Grenada, Belize, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, Guyana, Suriname, and Haiti, sit on the TAC 
(CDEMA n.d., c). 
The regional Coordinating Unit (CU) is an inter-
governmenta l agency that coordinates all the disaster 
management activities. The CU concentrates on five pro-
gramming areas: (1) education, research, and information; (2) 
finance and administration; (3) preparedness and response; 
(4) mitigation and research; and (5) information and commu-
nication technology (CDEMA n.d., d). An Executive Director 
who is appointed by the CDEMA Council manages the 
Coordinating Unit.
At the country level are the national disaster offices 
(NDOs) each with its own partners, systems of operation, 
governance frameworks, and protocols. There is no standard-
ization of organization name, structure, or title of officers in 
charge; these vary from country to country (Thompson 2010). 
National disaster offices are part of the national governments 
of each country and are under the constant watch of the 
national governments and other actors in the national political 
environment. The national disaster offices remain strongly 
centralized but have relationships with many organizations 
within and outside of government. They are located at a low 
level of their government structure: in only a handful of coun-
tries they are at the cabinet level, and they are usually situated 
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Figure 1. CDEMA organization structure
Source: Revised from Thompson 2010, 33.
in line ministries. This low status was noted as a point of 
concern in the Enhanced CDM Strategy and Program Frame-
work 2007–2012 (CDERA 2006). It denies NDOs many 
of the resources they need, including staffing, funding, and 
technology and makes decision making difficult. These 
situations have led to high turnover among national disaster 
coordinators.
To more fully understand how CDEMA functions, one 
must not only understand the vertical linkages presented in 
Figure 1, but also understand the horizontal relationships 
that exist within CDEMA and between CDEMA and outside 
partners. The horizontal linkages include CDEMA CU rela-
tionships with other regional bodies as well as the NDOs 
working collaboratively with each other to share knowledge 
and technical expertise. In addition there are many bilateral 
arrangements by both NDOs and the CDEMA CU collectivel y 
and individually. Although these arrangements cannot be seen 
on the organization chart, they are important to the overall 
CDEMA operation. The vertical and horizontal linkages dis-
played by CDEMA comport with the general consensus from 
the disaster management and organization theory literature 
that the network organizational form is the most appropriate 
organizational form for handling disasters (Takeda and Helms 
2006; Waugh and Streib 2006; Roberts 2006). Because the 
region is resource poor, no single agency has the capacity 
including technical expertise, technology, and financial 
resources it needs to effectively manage large-scale disasters 
when they occur. So, they enter into formal and informal 
arrangements with those that do.
At the same time, it is not uncommon for bureaucracy and 
network to coexist within the same organization, even in pub-
lic organizations (Mintzberg 1979; Perrow 1993; Considine 
and Lewis 1999; O’Toole and Meier 2004; Josserand, Teo, 
and Clegg 2006). A hybrid on network and bureaucracy in 
disaster management facilitates access to capabilities needed 
during different phases of the comprehensive disaster 
management cycle, while at the same time promoting good 
organizational memory for knowledge retention, internal 
efficiencies, control needed for the routine operations in 
disaster management, and the ability to coordinate the dispa-
rate functional groups that must work together for disaster 
management to be effective when there are major hazard 
events. 
Because it understands the organizational, national, mac-
ro-environmental, and geographic issues—including the need 
to address climate change as a region of small island states—
the regional coordinating unit of CDEMA realizes that learn-
ing is a crucial component in managing disaster planning and 
response. CDEMA utilizes an implicit learning model that 
entails capturing lessons from wherever they occur, cultivat-
ing knowledge, analyzing those pieces of information, and 
using them to guide regional and national level policy and 
practice (Thompson 2010). This model is presented in 
Figure 2 below.
CDEMA’s Implicit Learning Model 
In my research on CDEMA (Thompson 2010), I depicted 






















Thompson. Leveraging Learning to Improve Disaster Management Outcomes 201
iterative process of capturing information from various 
sources, applying this information to organizational processe s, 
and then refining and retaining knowledge acquired for future 
use. Figure 2 depicts the learning logic of CDEMA. It shows 
four stages for capturing, creating, and retaining knowledge. 
Together these stages show how CDEMA achieves double-
loop learning. This process of learning evolved through the 
CDEMA CU leadership’s exploration of ways to increase 
effectiveness given their resource-poor nature of their institu-
tions and the potential impact of climate change. This section 
draws heavily upon Thompson’s work.
At stage one, CDEMA’s regional Coordinating Unit cap-
tures information from its observation of various experiences 
and from national disaster coordinators via regular reports, 
telephone conversations, situation reports, after-action-
reports, and audits. The regional CU also collects information 
from incidents that take place in countries outside of the 
region through news reports, best practice reports, contacts 
with international agencies, and agreements (Thompson 
2010). 
Stage two comprises two sub-stages: (1) CDEMA analyze s, 
validates, and documents the collected information, and (2) it 
cultivates knowledge through events such as self-reflection 
and simulation exercises. The CU and the CDEMA Board 
scrutinize the information collected or generated to make 
sense of events and scenarios and plan for the next steps to 
be taken. During this stage, CDEMA assesses the relevance 
and applicability of the information by comparing them with 
other relevant and available information (Thompson 2010).
At stage three, the application of learning by organization-
al leaders results in some behavior modification as seen in the 
policies, strategies, procedures, practices, and model docu-
ments. Although CDEMA CU is the driver for learning and 
knowledge application, it is up to the national disaster offices 
to implement lessons in order to drive change nationally.
At stage four, information is codified into appropriate 
categories. Organizational leaders are the agents of informa-
tion collation, analysis, and change. At this stage, archived 
information is secured to prevent loss. This information is 
then promulgated in various reports and models so that those 
involved with CDEMA or wanting information on CDEMA 
can access and use that information. This stage is not yet 
fully developed.
8 How CDEMA Uses the Learning Model 
to Achieve Double-Loop Learning
Caribbean disaster managers describe five broad sources of 
knowledge capture: Country experiences, simulation exer-
cises, best practices, out-of-region disaster experiences, and 
self-reflection (Thompson 2010). Together they constitute 
CDEMA’s double-loop learning logic. Table 2 provides a 
summary of these knowledge sources along with the lessons 
learned from each source and their application. 
Country Experiences 
Learning from country experiences can best be summed up in 
the lessons learned from Hurricane Ivan described earlier and 
from CDEMA’s response to Hurricane Dean three years later 
that resulted in significantly less loss of lives and property 
damage and internal displacement. Heeding the lessons of 
Hurricane Ivan, all projected storms are now taken seriously. 
As an example, in preparation for Hurricane Dean, CDEMA 
did a number of things differently. The CDEMA CU activated 
the Regional Response Mechanism (RRM), which was placed 
on standby seventy-two hours before the projected landfall of 
Hurricane Dean (Arthurs 2008). The National Disaster Com-
mittees in the threatened states reviewed their preparedness 
and response plans and initiated readiness actions. CDERA 
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Figure 2. Model for capturing, cultivating, applying, and retaining information 
Source: Modified from Thompson 2010, 257.
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contacted National Disaster Coordinators and government 
officials to ascertain preparedness levels. None of these 
activities took place prior to Hurricane Ivan. In addition, both 
the Eastern and the North Western Caribbean Donor Groups 
convened meetings, and CDEMA developed an operational 
plan for worst case scenario in Jamaica and Belize (Gentles 
2008). The Pan American Health Organization pre-deployed 
in Jamaica, St. Lucia, and Dominica to more readily assess 
the public health needs in the impacted states. The United 
States Agency for International Development’s Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) deployed a 
team to Jamaica, and simultaneously stationed a consultant in 
Dominica to coordinate response activities in the smaller 
Eastern Caribbean States (Gentles 2008).
The response to Hurricane Dean highlighted the value 
of the Eastern Caribbean Donor Group now renamed the 
Eastern Caribbean Development Partners Group for Disaster 
Management (ECDPGDM). The ECDPGDM was formed 
after Hurricane Ivan to support regional mechanisms and 
member states in the smaller eastern islands to facilitate an 
effective, timely, and coordinated response operation to a 
rapid onset emergency (United Nations Development 
Program n.d.). The group was able to provide substantial 
assistance to Dominica during Hurricane Dean. Given the 
success of the ECDPGDM during Hurricane Dean, donors 
collaborated to develop a Northwestern Caribbean Donor 
Group in order to coordinate donor activities post impact in 
the Northwestern Caribbean region (Jackson 2008; Mullings 
2008).
Simulation Exercises
CDEMA has learned that when there are scarce financial 
resources, simulation exercises can help to identify gaps in 
key areas of operation and also provide insights into what is 
needed to fill these gaps in order to better respond to future 
events. Exercise FAHUM is a case in point. This annual field 
exercise is coordinated by United States Military Southern 
Command (SOUTHCOM) to help the region improve 
response coordination, communication, logistics, contingenc y 
planning, and improve efficiencies among member countries 
in the CDEMA organization. By posing different scenarios 
and attempting to solve problems, simulation exercises allow 
CDEMA to facilitate its mandate of comprehensive disaster 
management. Simulation exercises (both tabletop and field) 
allow CDEMA to be preemptive in planning for disasters. 
Simulation scenarios help CDEMA to make systemic 
improvements throughout the system through highlighting 
successes, failures, and unintended consequence. Simulation 
exercises offer opportunities for transformative changes 
and associated improved performance as a result of these 
changes.
Best Practices
Best practices come from both the country and international 
arenas. For instance, international best practice has assisted 
CDEMA in positioning disaster management on the regional 
policy agenda. For example, the Hyogo Framework for 
Action (UNISDR 2005) articulated a vision that integrating 
disaster reduction considerations into public policies and 
Table 2. Summary of learning modes and their application throughout CDEMA
Modes of Learning Summary of Lessons Learned by CDEMA Application of Lessons Learned
Country experience Technical and technological capabilities and human 
resources are areas of weakness for CDEMA. Low 
positioning of national level disaster offices hinders 
access to critical resources (Grenada and Dominica are 
examples); NDOs’ performances at the national level 
hindered overall CDEMA performance
–  Enhance technical and technological capability in areas of response 
(seen in excellent Hurricane Dean response);
–  Improve contingency planning for multi-island hazard impacts; 
development of regional response mechanisms
Simulation exercises Simulation exercises are important to improve systems 
and processes in disaster management; they are 
especially useful for planning and system appraisal in 
resource scarce areas
–  Improvement in communications and coordination based on tabletop 
and field exercises (as in Hurricane Dean); 
–  Building community response capability and involving leaders of 
economic sectors in disaster planning 
Best practices Introduction of international standards like Hyogo 
Framework for Actioni into regional practice allows 
access to resources for CDEMA through project funding, 
as well as important lessons from other countries and 
methodologies for disaster risk reduction
–  Lessons led to Coordination and Harmonization Council—leads to 
better optimization of funding, etc;
–  Introduction of results-based approach (better measurement of 




Mitigation is an important component of comprehensive 
disaster management (CDM) that needs to be empha-
sized in the region
– Improvements in contingency planning capability;




How to deliver objectives and leverage limited resources 
better; Lessons on how CDEMA can become more 
effective
–  Better organizing and strategizing for delivery of CDM—e.g. 
Thematic Coordinating Groups;
–  Using projects to drive the delivery of CDM and leverage scarce 
resources;
–  Strategically filling capability gaps in the CDEMA system by linking 
with international disaster reduction arrangements (Hyogo 
Framework for Action)
Source: This table was refined from one developed in Thompson 2010, 227.
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and CDERA’s management started to question whether a 
response focus was the right vision or mandate for the orga-
nization (Mullings 2008). The discussions intensified in 2006, 
when the CDERA management again realized that there were 
gaps in the CDM mandate as developed in 2001 and that it 
needed to improve its then current strategy. The result was 
the enhanced comprehensive disaster management strategy 
2007–2012, which focused on measurable sector-specific 
outcomes in four key areas: enhanced institutional support for 
CDM program implementation at the national and regional 
levels; effective mechanisms and programs for management 
and sharing of CDM knowledge utilized especially for 
decision-making; mainstreaming disaster risk management in 
the key sectors of national economies such as tourism, agri-
culture, and healthcare; and enhanced community resilience 
to mitigate and respond to the adverse effects of climate 
change (CDERA 2006). The sectors are coordinated by the 
CDM Coordination and Harmonization Council.
Through self-reflection CDEMA has realized that focus-
ing on economic sectors via Thematic Coordinating Groups 
to drive the enhanced CDM efforts would be more beneficial 
than continuing to do so at the national level. For Instance, 
progress reports suggest that using the sector focus has 
increased awareness and advocacy for CDM and collabora-
tive initiatives on CDM (Rahat n.d.). The sector focus is 
coordinated by thematic Coordinating Groups, which pro-
vides more targeted interventions and yields better results. 
The sector focus ensures more effective coverage and moni-
toring. Information from sectors filters up to the national 
level and is analyzed, documented, and sent to the regional 
level, which completes a comprehensive assessment of 
achievements and shortcomings. Guided by the Coordinating 
Unit, the CDEMA system then implements remedial action.
In sum, CDEMA, guided by the regional Coordinating 
Unit, not only captures lessons, but also cultivates knowledge 
and acts upon this knowledge to promote change. CDEMA 
does this because it wants to detect and correct flaws through 
strategic interventions so that the organization is not left 
vulnerable in the future. More fundamentally, CDEMA culti-
vates knowledge through self-reflection on its fundamental 
assumptions so as to strategically position itself to perform 
better in the future. Argyris and Schön (1978) remind us that 
when we start to question the governing variables themselves, 
we operate in the realm of double-loop learning.
Senge (1990) instructs us that double-loop learning is 
generative and strategic. Its perspective surrounds future 
strategies involved in creating and solving an organization’s 
own problems as well as integration of new and old; its 
impact is transformative; its outlook is long term; its strategy 
is active engagements; and its culture is system-wide thinking 
and self-questioning. Using lessons learned, CDEMA, 
through the CDEMA CU has questioned governing principles 
and assumptions by moving from a focus on disaster response 
to comprehensive disaster management. It has shifted focus 
from national level planning to a more sector-specific 
programs was the most effective way to have disaster man-
agement policy instituted at the national level. As a result, the 
CDEMA Council decided to make mainstreaming disaster 
management into government policies and programs one of 
the objectives of the Enhanced CDM Strategy and Program 
Framework 2007–2012 (CDERA 2006). Much of the CDEM A 
comprehensive disaster management benchmarks come 
from international organizations such as the United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction that promotes 
the Hyogo Framework for Action. Further, CDEMA has 
learned, based on international best practice, that managing 
for results facilitates better targeted interventions, monitoring 
of progress, and measuring of outcomes. CDEMA, then, has 
integrated results-based management approach into its 
Enhanced CDM strategy and Program Framework 2007–
2012.
Out-of-Region Experiences
Experiences from the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake in China, and 
the Southeast Asian Tsunami in 2004 have been instructive in 
helping CDEMA to assess its state of readiness for such large 
scale, high impact, low probability events (Gentles 2008; 
Herbert and Peets 2008; Mullin 2008). For instance, by 
assessing the impacts of these overseas events, CDEMA 
understood that there were critical deficiencies in mitigation. 
As a consequence, emphasis on mitigation was an important 
part of the enhanced CDM strategy for 2007–2012. 
CDEMA has also embarked on efforts to mainstream 
mitigation measures, specifically to mitigate hazard impact 
on coastal communities. One such example is the testing 
and subsequent adaptation of the tsunami protocol suite in 
Antigua and Barbuda 7–9 July 2009 (Smart 2011). This set of 
tsunami response rules was adopted after the Southeast Asian 
Tsunami to shore up the regional capacity to detect tsunamis, 
relay tsunami-related information in a timely manner, and 
respond to them if necessary (United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization n.d.). 
Self-Reflection
CDEMA does annual self-reflections through its board meet-
ings, conferences, and dialogue with regional stakeholders 
such as the Caribbean Center for Development Administra-
tion (CARICAD) as well as with international aid agencies 
(Gentles 2008). Through these questioning and strategizing 
sessions, the CDEMA CU proposed, and the CDEMA 
Council adopted, several fundamental changes. For example, 
the name change from CDERA to CDEMA in 2010 was the 
culmination of this reflection—changing the name would 
allow the organization to better position itself to acquire the 
resources needed to achieve the broader comprehensive 
disaster management (CDM) strategy. The name change 
comported better with the new focus on all phases of the 
disaster management cycle, not solely on disaster response.
Reflection on the name change began a decade earlier in 
the late 1990s after a series of storms devastated the region 
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greater learning (Fiol and Lyles 1985). CDEMA is an organi-
zation that displays both network and bureaucratic structures 
and relationships both at the regional and national levels—the 
national level is more bureaucratic than networked, while 
the regional level is more networked than bureaucratic. It is 
understandable that we see more generative learning at the 
regional level, while the national level often fails to optimize 
learning opportunities. At the national level there is a focus 
on single-loop or single-cause learning in that there are 
frequent enough emergences that they become routine events, 
political fallout from handling or reporting them must be 
dealt with, and the constant struggle to access financial and 
other resources exists. These conditions mean that disaster 
managers are constantly responding to issues besides 
disaster management. As a result, they miss important 
disaster management lessons. 
Learning organizations typically possess a culture com-
mitted to continuous learning and change throughout the 
entire organization. As the case of CDEMA shows there are 
different cultures and, consequently, different dispositions 
to learning throughout the various organizational levels. 
Chandler (1990) observes that at the level of overall business 
environment cultural values guide business operations, struc-
ture its legal context, and provide the broad meanings by 
which we interpret business events. There are leadership 
issues at the national level. Because leadership is an impor-
tant precursor to a culture committed to learning, those orga-
nizations that frequently change leadership will not possess a 
culture committed to learning. Most of the national disaster 
offices suffer from this malady; there is high turnover at the 
top. This frequent changing of the guard does not provide a 
fertile environment for active learning. The barriers to foster-
ing a culture committed to learning in the CDEMA system 
rest mainly at the national level. 
10 Conclusion
This article shows that CDEMA practices double-loop learn-
ing despite its known barriers. The research question guiding 
this research was: Is it possible to create a culture committed 
to continuous self-diagnosis, learning, and change? The 
evidence suggests that the regional CDEMA CU practices 
double-loop learning. CDEMA detects and corrects flaws 
through strategic interventions to minimize future vulnerabil-
ities. CDEMA also cultivates knowledge through self-
reflection on its fundamental assumptions and what is needed 
to succeed in disaster management. These reflections and 
self-questioning help CDEMA position itself strategically 
to perform better in the future. The notion of facilitating a 
culture committed to continuous self-diagnosis, learning, and 
change is especially important for resource poor regions like 
the Caribbean, which are vulnerable to external shocks and 
numerous hazards. As the case of the CDEMA CU shows, 
resource-poor organizations can learn and leverage double-
loop learning to limit their vulnerabilities. 
approach, which involves more people in disaster manage-
ment efforts. Its stance has altered from passive engagement 
to a more proactive one in which it foresees problems 
and tries to solve them through regional and international 
alliances. 
As the examples above highlight, CDEMA does experi-
ence double-loop learning. This is seen in the learning activi-
ties and changes fostered especially at the regional level. 
As national level disaster management operations show, 
inculcating a culture committed to learning is extremely 
difficult given CDEMA’s structure and the cultural variation 
present among CDEMA participating member states and the 
regional Coordinating Unit. This is the biggest impediment to 
establishing the learning culture that Schein advocates. 
9 Barriers to Double-Loop Learning 
throughout the Entire CDEMA 
Organization
Even though the CDEMA CU does practice and facilitate 
double-loop learning at the regional level, there are barriers, 
especially at the national level that prevent the entire CDEMA 
system from being a learning organization. Two different 
cultures coexist in the CDEMA system. One culture at the 
regional level is amenable to self-reflection, strategic assess-
ments and intervention, and wide staff involvement. Another 
culture at the national level wants to learn, but is trapped in a 
vicious cycle of putting out fires because it lacks human and 
other resources. This might be because the national disaster 
offices are so steeped in their national government bureaucra-
cies. The exceptions are countries like the British Virgin 
Islands, the Bahamas, and Jamaica. In other words, there is a 
problem-solving culture pervasive at the national level upon 
which the CU and the Council attempt to superimpose and 
inculcate a learning culture. 
It is important to understand this context and how it 
impacts learning. Carroll (1998) rightly points out that, 
bureaucracies tend to drift towards rigidity because of the 
politics that grow around them and their need for efficiency. 
This rigidity at the country level is seen in the rules, proce-
dures, sanctions, and political oversight built into national 
systems. The regional Coordinating Unit is an intergovern-
mental agency and not as bogged down by the level of politi-
cal oversight seen at the country level. The CU focuses all its 
efforts on disaster management and is less constrained by 
fights over resources than are participating countries. In addi-
tion, decision-making is easier at the CU than at the national 
level where national disaster offices must struggle through 
multiple levels of decision-making because of their low 
status. As a consequence, double-loop learning is easier at the 
regional level.
Structure determines learning processes (Simon 1969; Fiol 
and Lyles 1985). While a centralized mechanistic structure 
tends to reinforce past behaviors, more decentralized struc-
ture tends to allow shifts of beliefs and actions and facilitates 
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countries. More information on the Hyogo Framework for Action 
can be found in United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction 2005.
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